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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court defined the
scope of individual liberty broadly enough to prevent Texas from
criminalizing homosexual sodomy.' While this decision clearly in-
validated state laws proscribing gay or straight sodomy, and perhaps
similarly limited state power to criminalize other adult consensualS 2
sexual behavior, such as fornication, Lawrence's implications in areas
other than private adult sexual conduct remain unclear and subject
to much speculation.3
This Article explores the doctrinal and political links between the
liberty interest defined in Lawrence and the not yet established right
to control the manner and timing of one's death. Examining the
similarity between these two legal issues, as well as the political dy-
namics surrounding them, can yield insights into the future devel-
opment of substantive due process law. In Washington v. Glucksberg,
the Court held that the terminally ill have no fundamental right to
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College; J.D. 1985, Rutgers University School of Law at Newark. I would like to thank Pamela
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539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
2 See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1112-13 (2004) (listing
fornication as an example of sexual activity that cannot be criminalized on morality grounds as
proof that Lawrence expands the realm in which consenting adults can make private sexual
choices).
3 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
CATO S. CT. REv. 21, 41 (predicting that Lawrence's shift from privacy to liberty will affect the
medical marijuana cases); Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
SUP. CT. REV. 75, 137 (exploring Lawrence's potential impact on gay marriage); Hunter, supra
note 2, at 1132 (suggesting that courts analyzing the gay marriage issue will have to confront the
Lawrence standard that morality cannot be the sole rationale for banning same-sex marriages);
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117
HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1934-35 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence is vague by design and will therefore
have longevity in substantive due process jurisprudence); Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substan-
tive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2792, 2798-99 (2005) (arguing that
Lawrence opened the door for framing other fundamental rights cases in more general terms).
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obtain assistance in ending their lives.4 In the nine years since that
decision, political debate on the right to die and assisted suicide has
altered the framework for this issue, and the doctrinal landscape has
also changed with the Court's rejection of Bowers v. Hardwick5 and ex-
pansion of liberty rights in Lawrence.
The parallels between the right asserted by the plaintiffs in Law-
rence, to be free from state interference in arranging and acting on
intimate sexual and emotional commitments to other adults, and the
right asserted in Glucksberg by the terminally ill, to control the man-
ner and timing of the most intimate and private of all moments,
death, are remarkable. In Glucksberg, that right was rejected. In Bow-
ers the right to form a relationship that includes sodomy was also re-
jected. Bowers has now been overturned. This Article asks whether
Glucksberg is next.
The parallels between the political debate about the criminaliza-
tion of sodomy and gay rights generally and the debate about the
right to die are also remarkable. Both issues are obvious hot zones in
the nation's culture wars. This Article considers how the broad po-
litical turmoil arising out of the current American zeitgeist may result
in a similar legal framework for both issues. Lawrence was decided in
an atmosphere of growing tolerance and acceptance of gay rights, but
has also spurred anxiety and backlash on the issue of gay marriage.
Restrictions on assisted suicide are, in some spheres, currently loosen-
ing with the emergence of a broad belief that government should not
interfere with personal decisions in this area. In other political
spheres, however, there is fear that this trend undermines a "culture
of life" that needs to be preserved and promoted. In both gay rights
and assisted suicide, Supreme Court rulings take place in a politically
charged context certain to create controversy.
Part Two of this Article examines the scope of the liberty right de-
fined in Lawrence and explore its applicability to the claim that com-
petent, terminally ill adults have a right to control the circumstances
of their deaths. Part Three looks at the larger socio-political debate
surrounding the two issues and consider how that debate has influ-
enced the Court's treatment. Part Four attempts, in light of that
analysis, to discern the future course of the claimed right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide.
II. LAWRENCE'S LIBERTY INTEREST AND GLUCKSBERG'S LIMITS
The conclusion that Texas's sodomy law violated due process in
Lawrence was based on the Court's determination that
521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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[l]iberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places .... and there are other spheres of
our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be
a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
6
expression, and certain intimate conduct.
The limit and contours of spheres that are protected from govern-
ment intrusion have been the subject of extensive debate since the
decision was issued in 2003. Whether Lawrence applies to anything
other than intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults is un-
clear. However, the manner in which the Court delineated and ex-
plained the liberty interest that protected the defendants in Lawrence
suggests that the Court has significantly changed its perspective on
the nature and extent of due process protection.
The reason, according to the Court, that Texas could not prohibit
sodomy was that individuals, such as the defendants in Lawrence, have
the right to define the meaning of their lives at its most intimate core.
To prohibit the sexual expression chosen by the defendants would be
to deny them autonomy in this most personal choice, autonomy that
is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Moving away from the
emphasis on privacy established in earlier due process cases, Lawrence
focuses on liberty and the illegitimacy of government actions against
the defendants that "demean their existence or control their destiny
by making their private sexual conduct a crime. ' 8
Eschewing the version of history that the Court relied upon in
Bowers9 to reject a due process challenge to the criminalization of
sodomy,'0 the Court in Lawrence acknowledged the "emerging aware-
6 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
7 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("[The] right of privacy... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (explaining the "zone of privacy" created by the Constitu-
tion).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy relied on Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which had been decided
after Bowers and which "confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education.. . 'involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy. .. .'" Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 573-74 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851); see also Barnett, supra note 3, at 36 (suggesting
thatJustice Kennedy employed a "presumption of liberty," requiring the government to justify
its restriction on liberty rather than requiring the litigant to establish the fundamentality of the
interest).
9 478 U.S. at 192-94.
10 "[T]here is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual con-
duct as a distinct matter .... [E] arly American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as
such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally." Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 568. What the Bowers Court did in its long recitation of anti-sodomy laws is fail to
acknowledge that these laws had little to do with homosexuality. Instead, it linked the long-
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ness" that adults should be free to conduct their private sexual lives
without interference from the state." The Court relied upon chang-
ing state sodomy laws, 12 as well as developments in European law, in-
cluding the European Court of Human Rights, and concluded that
"[t] he right that petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.' ' 3 Justice
Kennedy's citation to foreign law as relevant to the determination of
the requirements of due process is a rare, and quite controversial, use
of foreign law by the Supreme Court.14 Since the treatment of sod-
omy in the United States was similar to, and in part drawn from, the
traditions elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe, comparison of
the current law in the United States to the law of other jurisdictions
was considered relevant by the Court.
What emerges from Lawrence is a definition of liberty linked to
self-definition and freedom from government interference with re-
spect to central and intimate decisions about one's existence. Rather
than limiting the protections of the Due Process Clause to "funda-
standing condemnation of non-procreative sex to a condemnation of homosexuality. See Diana
Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 813, 820-21 (2001)
(examining the link between the criminalization of sodomy and homosexual sexual behavior).
I Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
1 Id. at 570-71, 576.
The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers deci-
sion are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual con-
duct. In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or hetero-
sexual conduct, there is a pattern of non-enforcement with respect to consenting adults
acting in private.
Id. at 573; see, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (Ark. 2002) (declaring that there is a
state constitutional right to privacy that protects private, consensual, noncommercial acts of
sexual intimacy); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24-25 (Ga. 1998) (finding a law criminalizing
sodomy inconsistent with the right of privacy guaranteed by the state constitution); Common-
wealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 496-500 (Ky. 1992) (finding consensual sodomy beyond the
reach of the state, based on guarantees in the state constitution); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,
123 (Mont. 1997) (holding that the state constitutional right to privacy prevents criminal pro-
hibition of sodomy); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 262-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that criminalization of consensual sodomy is inconsistent with the state constitutional
right to privacy).
13 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. In 1981, the European Court of Human Rights struck down
laws in Northern Ireland prohibiting sexual activity between men because the laws violated the
European Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1981). The European Court's decision is binding on the forty-four member states of the
Council of Europe.
4 justice Scalia vehemently objected to the use of foreign law: "The Court's discussion
of... foreign views ... is... meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this
Court... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."' Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, The Relevance of Foreign
Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 519, 522-41 (2005) (explaining the contrasting opinions of
the two Justices in their approach to incorporating foreign law into Supreme Court opinions).
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mental rights," the government must justify its restriction on liberty. 5
This more flexible approach to due process marked a departure from
an earlier methodology that emphasized narrowly defining the scope
of a fundamental right.'0 The Court did not define conducting an in-
timate sexual relationship as a fundamental right, which would pre-
sumably invoke strict scrutiny, but analyzed the right using a more
ambiguous, nominally rational basis, standard.'
7
Of course, this liberty interest must be balanced against the harm
caused in exercising the right.' 8 In Lawrence, the reason articulated
for the prohibition of sodomy by the state was that the majority of
citizens of Texas considered the practice immoral. ' 9 The Court con-
sidered moral disapproval an insufficient justification for the law; the
state thus had no legitimate interest in passing the law. 0 The state's
reasons for outlawing sodomy failed to meet even a rational basis
standard.
When faced with the question of whether terminally ill patients
had a right to physician-assisted suicide, the Court, in Glucksberg, ap-
proached the due process analysis quite differently than it did in Law-
rence.2 1 The plaintiffs in Glucksberg were terminally ill people who
15 See Barnett, supra note 3, at 41 (arguing that the Lawrence approach to liberty has implica-
tions in areas other than sexual conduct, such as the medical use of marijuana).
16 Hunter, supra note 2, at 1112-13 (explaining the departure from narrow fundamental
rights analysis).
17 See Case, supra note 3, at 118-22 (referring to justice Kennedy's "habit of... disregarding
the carefully erected tiers of scrutiny and three-part tests of constitutional common law"); Tribe,
supra note 3, at 1934-35 ("[A]ny such exercise in enumeration [of fundamental rights] is a
fool's errand that misconceives the structure of liberty and of the constitutional doctrines that
provide its contents.").
The standard of review used by the Court in Lawrence seems to draw upon the "rational basis
with bite" approach used in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup:
Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1312,
1329-32 (2004) (analogizing the reasoning behind the Court's inquiry into the rationality of a
restriction against the mentally disabled in Cleburne and homosexuals in Lawrence).
18 "[D]etermining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process Clause does
not end the inquiry; 'whether [the individual's] constitutional rights have been violated must be
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests."' Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 768 (1997).
19 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
20 Id. at 577-78. The state interests asserted by Texas for the sodomy statute were: "the con-
tinued expression of the State's long-standing moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, and
the deterrence of such immoral sexual activity, particularly with regard to the contemplated
conduct of heterosexuals and bisexuals." Brief of Respondents at 41, Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
21 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-11 ("We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examin-
ing our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.... [O]pposition to and condemnation
of suicide-and, therefore, of assisted suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our phi-
losophical, legal, and cultural heritages." (footnote & citations omitted)).
While the Court unanimously upheld the state law criminalizing assisted suicide, several dif-
ferent opinions were written. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court. In addi-
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claimed that Washington's prohibition against assisted suicide vio-
lated their constitutional rights. They argued that their due process
rights would be violated if their physicians were prosecuted for grant-
ing their request for a drug that would hasten an already imminent
death.23
The plaintiffs argued that there is a "liberty interest in determin-
ing the time and manner of one's death." 4 In Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health, the Court had earlier presumed that the
liberty rights established by the Due Process Clause allowed a compe-
tent person to refuse medical treatment, including life-saving hydra-
25tion and nutrition. While a right to speed one's death by refusing
food and water seemed established, Glucksberg raised the question
whether hastening death through assistance from physician pre-
scribed medication was also a protected liberty interest. The Court
outlined a two prong test for determining whether the Due Process
Clause encompassed the liberty interest asserted by the petitioners.
The first requirement was that the claimed liberty right be "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and secondly, that the
right be carefully described. 6 Thus, the scope of the due process
protections must be "carefully refined by concrete examples involving
fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradi-
t i o n .
'2 
1
tion, five concurring opinions were filed by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and
Stevens.
" The Washington statute made it a crime to "knowingly cause[] or aid[] another person to
attempt suicide." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1997). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals initially upheld the law by holding that there was no constitutional right to aid in kill-
ing oneself. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995). In a rehear-
ing en banc, however, the court determined that "insofar as the Washington statute prohibits
physicians from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally ill, competent adults
who wish to hasten their own deaths, it violates the Due Process Clause ...." Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom, Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). See generally SUSAN M. BEHUNIAK & ARTHUR G. SVENSON, PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE: THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUE (Rowman & Littlefielf 2003)
(tracing the issue of physician-assisted suicide in constitutional law).
2 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 754 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing the plaintiffs claim of a
liberty interest in assisted suicide).
24 Id. at 722 (quoting Compassion, 79 F.3d at 801).
25 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). The Court went on to determine that, notwithstanding this lib-
erty interest, Missouri could require that a competent decision to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 284. In a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan argued that "Nancy Cruzan has a
fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration, which right is not
out-weighed by any interests of the State, and ... the improperly biased procedural obstacles
imposed by the Missouri Supreme Court impermissibly burden that right.. . ." Id. at 302 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens similarly dissented, determining that Missouri's law imper-
missibly disregarded Nancy Cruzan's best interests. Id. at 356 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
27 See id. at 722.
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This analysis led the Court in Glucksberg to examine the historical
prohibition of suicide, as well as assisted suicide, and to deemphasize
recent, less restrictive, approaches to this issue by some states and by
foreign governments."8 The Court concluded that, notwithstanding
some re-examination and change in the law, the prohibition of as-
sisted suicide is consistent with "history, tradition, and practice. 29
The Court rejected the argument that physician-assisted suicide was
mandated by the tradition of "self-sovereignty," determining that the
fact "[t]hat many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and per-
sonal decisions are so protected ... .
Taking a different approach and relying on Justice Harlan's dis-
sent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Souter in his concurrence maintained
that the Court was obligated to review state action to determine if its
prohibitions are consistent with "a concept of 'ordered liberty,' com-
prising a continuum of rights to be free from 'arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints.' 3' This review is accomplished by weigh-
ing the value of the individual right asserted against the state's inter-
32ests. Important to the Court's task is assessing the level of generality
at which the individual's and the state's interests are articulated. In
analyzing the issues raised in Glucksberg, according to Justice Souter,
the Court was faced with a claim "not to a right on the part of just
anyone to help anyone else commit suicide under any circumstances,
28 Id. at 718-19.
29 Id. at 719.
30 Id. at 727. ChiefJustice Rehnquist distinguished the right to refuse medical treatment set
forth in Cruzan from the right to assisted suicide, emphasizing the long standing common law
rule underlying the right to refuse treatment. No similar common law right existed with respect
to assisted suicide. Id. at 725. The right to personal autonomy articulated in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), was distinguished from the decision to
hasten one's death by noting that the right set forth in Casey concerned "personal decisions re-
lating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and educa-
tion." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). This same distinction was
made in Bowers when the Court concluded that there was "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other .... " Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
In spite of his rejection of the claim that physician-assisted suicide was a fundamental right,
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the Court's opinion did not foreclose the possibility that a
more particularized claim for assisted suicide might succeed. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 n.24.
31 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
543 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting)).
32 See id. at 767.
This approach calls for a court to assess the relative "weights" or dignities of the
contending interests .... [S]uch a court is bound to confine the values that it recognizes
to those truly deserving constitutional stature, either to those expressed in constitutional
text, or those exemplified by "the traditions from which [the Nation] developed," or re-
vealed by contrast with "the traditions from which it broke."
Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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but to the right of a narrow class to help others also in a narrow class
under a set of limited circumstances."33 Given this framework for the
question, Justice Souter emphasized a different history: the decrimi-
nalization of suicide, the recognition in the law of a right to bodily in-
tegrity, and the tradition of a right to medical care and counsel.3 In
light of that history, Justice Souter concluded that "the importance of
the individual interest here, [is] within that class of 'certain interests'
demanding careful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim ....
Similarly, Justice Stevens concurred in the rejection of a facial
challenge to the prohibition on assisted suicide, but concluded that
in some circumstances denying a person access to medical assistance
in ending life might violate the guarantees of the Due Process
36Clause. Linking the ability to control the manner of one's death
with the protection provided by the Due Process Clause from state in-
trusion into "matters 'central to personal dignity and autonomy,' 37
Justice Stevens concluded that: "Avoiding intolerable pain and the
indignity of living one's final days incapacitated and in agony is cer-
tainly '[a]t the heart of [the] liberty ... to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning. of the universe, and of the mystery of hu-
man life."'3s Cruzan, maintained Justice Stevens, had already estab-
lished that some individuals on the verge of death have a constitu-
33 Id. at 773. Similarly, in Vacco v. Quill, Justice Souter maintained that the right to physician
assistance in hastening death should be accorded "a high degree of importance, requiring a
commensurate justification" when the state sought to limit it. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809
(1997) (Souter,J., concurring).
34 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 779-80 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter compares a physi-
cian's role in assisted suicide to the role of a physician in abortion. In the abortion context, the
Court has recognized the key role of physicians and the importance of the relationship between
physician and patient:
Its value is surely as apparent here as in the abortion cases, for just as the decision about
abortion is not directed to correcting some pathology, so the decision in which a dying
patient seeks help is not so limited. The patients here sought not only an end to
pain.., but an end to their short remaining lives with ... dignity ....
Id. at 779.
35 Id. at 782. Justice O'Connor, similarly, would leave open the "question whether a men-
tally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable
interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death." Id. at 736 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). She concluded, however, that the Due Process Clause does not protect a gen-
eralized right to assistance in committing suicide. Id. at 738.
36 Id. at 741 (Stevens, J., concurring). "I do not.., foreclose the possibility that an individ-
ual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail
in a more particularized challenge. Future cases will determine whether such a challenge may
succeed." Id. at 750.
37 Id. at 744 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
Id. at 745 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). Justice Stevens argued that Cruzan's determi-
nation that a person such as Nancy Cruzan, who suffered from an irreversible and progressive
illness, had the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment was based not solely on the com-
mon law tradition, but also on her "interest in controlling the manner and timing of her
death." Id. at 742.
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tional interest in controlling the manner of their death that out-
weighs the state's interests.39
While disagreeing about whether the right to control the end of
one's life might constitute a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
the Justices in Glucksberg agreed that the state had legitimate and im-
portant interests that justified the prohibition, at least in some cir-
cumstances, of assisted suicide.40 Those interests include: preserving
life generally; preventing suicide by those who suffer from mental ill-
ness; protecting the integrity of the medical profession; protecting
vulnerable groups from neglect or coercion; and preventing a move-
ment toward euthanasia. 4' These interests certainly met the rational
basis standard that the majority opinion applied, and may in some
circumstances meet the higher scrutiny the concurring opinions sug-
gest may be necessary.
In a linked case, Vacco v. Quill,42 the Court rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to the criminalization of physician-assisted suicide
given that patients may legally refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. The physicians challenging the New York ban on assisted sui-
cide argued that allowing a competent person to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment was "essentially the same thing" as assisted sui-
cide. 43 Patients who were receiving life-sustaining treatment were
therefore given a choice to hasten their deaths that those who were
similarly in the final stages of a fatal illness but not receiving life-
sustaining treatment did not have. The Court determined that "the
distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medi-
cal profession and in our legal traditions, is both important and logi-
cal; it is certainly rational." The distinction between "killing" and
"letting die" was considered a profound one by the Court. When a
patient refuses treatment, the underlying disease is the cause of
death; when a physician administers lethal medication, the medica-
tion is the cause of death.4 ' In withdrawing medical treatment, the
physician intends to honor the wishes of the patient; in administering
lethal medication, the physician intends to kill the patient.46 Accord-
39 See id. at 745.
40 Id. at 728-35.
41 See id.
42 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
43 Id. at 798.
44 Id. at 800-01 (footnote omitted).
45 Id. at 801.
46 Id. at 802.
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ingly, New York acted reasonably when it outlawed physician-assisted
suicide but permitted a patient to refuse treatment.
47
The majority opinion's approach to due process in Glucksberg is
quite similar to the majority opinion in Bowers,8 the decision over-
ruled in Lawrence. In both cases the perspective from which the
Court viewed the right determined the particular history that was
deemed relevant. In Glucksberg, viewing the issue as assisted suicide
generally, as opposed to the assisted suicide of competent, terminally
ill persons, meant that the Court could review the history of society's
condemnation of suicide in general, and easily conclude that no such
right existed.49  Likewise, asking whether homosexual sodomy was a
specifically recognized right meant that the Court in Bowers could
find no evidence of such a specific right being historically protected
and could cite, as support, historical condemnation of sodomy. ° Just
as in the Glucksberg treatment of the prohibition of assisted suicide,
Bowers presented an unambiguous story of condemnation of sod-
omy. 5! The focus on merely the act of sodomy in Bowers was criticized
in Lawrence when the Court concluded that the Court in Bowers failed
"to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. 52 Rather than con-
cerning merely a specific sex act, the prohibition against sodomy
touches upon "the most private human conduct .. in the most pri-
vate of places, the home., 53 Even given its crabbed construction of
47 In Vacco, the Court emphasized, as it had in Glucksberg, that Cruzan did not establish that
"patients have a general and abstract 'right to hasten death"'; rather, the right to refuse medical
treatment was grounded in the traditional right to be free from unwanted touching. Vacco, 521
U.S. at 807 (quoting Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
49
In almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist
a suicide.... Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide-and, therefore, of as-
sisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cul-
tural heritages.
More specifically, for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has
punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.
Wvashington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1997) (footnotes & citations omitted).
50
Proscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at
common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified
the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of
the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.
Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" is, at best, facetious.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (footnotes & citations omitted).
51 Id.
52 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
53 Id.
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the issue before it, the Bowers Court was found to have presented an
unnuanced and simplistic version of the historical condemnation of
sodomy.
54
In Glucksberg as in Bowers, the definition of the right asserted con-
trolled the history that was considered relevant to the determination
of whether the right would be recognized. The context in which the
right was asserted-that of terminally ill, mentally competent adults
who have requested assistance in dying-was inherently limiting;
however, this narrow context was ignored. Instead, because of the
way the Court in Glucksberg described the scope of the claim-
whether Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide violates the Due
Process Clause-the Court inevitably rejected the claim. 5 In Glucks-
berg the history presented by the majority opinion omits the decrimi-
nalization of suicide and the resulting expansion of personal auton-
56omy, and the tradition of patient care by physicians in the relief of
suffering. Just as in Bowers, the conclusion the Court came to in de-
termining the legitimacy of the purported liberty interest was greatly
influenced by the scope of the history it chose to emphasize.
In Lawrence, the Court adopted an approach more similar to the
concurrences in Glucksberg than to the Court's opinion. The histori-
cal progression of social and legal standards was emphasized as well
as the placement of the claimed right in a broad context. 8 Rather
than attempting to determine whether a fundamental right existed,
both the majority in Lawrence and the concurrences in Glucksberg bal-
anced the weight of the liberty interest asserted against the interests
of the state, resulting in a more flexible and variable answer to the
question of what due process protects. 59 These similarities suggest
that if the issues in Glucksberg were reexamined today, the approach
taken by the Court to frame the issue might well alter the outcome.
III. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL DEBATE CONCERNING GAY RIGHTS AND
THE RIGHT TO DIE
The transformation of the law regarding gay rights that took place
between Bowers and Lawrence was the result of doctrinal and political
changes that made the narrow approach taken toward sodomy in
Bowers no longer tenable. We may well be in the midst of a similar
political and doctrinal alteration as to the question of the right to die,
54 Id. at 567-70.
55 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
56 Id. at 775-76.
57 Id. at 779.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-78.
Id. at 578; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 764-82 (SouterJ., concurring); id. at 745-46 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 792 (BreyerJ., concurring).
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and specifically the right to physician-assisted suicide. The same doc-
trinal, statutory, and political changes that cleared the way for the
Lawrence decision may work to bring about a move away from the
Court's approach in Glucksberg. Examining the parallels in these two
areas illuminates significant similarities and also critical differences.
A. The Road to Lawrence
Lawrence represented, among other things, the resolution of a ten-
sion created between the 1986 Bowers opinion and the Court's ap-
proach to gay rights in the 1996 decision, Romer v. Evans. In Romer,
the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, determined that
a state could not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, treat
lesbians and gay men differently from other citizens based merely on
public disapproval of homosexuality. 6' This limitation of a state's abil-
ity to discriminate against gays and lesbians was hard to square with
the approach in Bowers that allowed the criminalization of homosex-
ual sodomy in part because of the historical disapproval of gays and
lesbians.62 Indeed, in upholding the sodomy law in Bowers, the Court
maintained that law "is constantly based on notions of morality."6' By
2003, when Lawrence was decided, the tension between these two ap-
proaches was resolved by a repudiation of the approach in Bowers,
and, on the part of Justice O'Connor, an application of the Romer
equal protection principles to the Texas sodomy law.65
Another development cited by Justice Kennedy that influenced
the outcome in Lawrence was the change in state law and in foreign
law relating to sodomy that had taken place since Bowers was decided
seventeen years earlier. 66 A more expansive look at the history of sod-
60 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see Diana Hassel, Lawrence v. Texas: Evolution of Constitutional Doc-
trine, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 565 (2004) (arguing that inconsistencies between Bowers,
Romer, and Lawrence reflect changes in Court personnel and in social attitudes on homosexuals
and sexuality in general).
61 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-36. In Romer, the Court found unconstitutional an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution that repealed state and local anti-discrimination laws based on sexual
orientation and which also prohibited government action protecting lesbians and gay men from
discrimination. Id. at 623.
62 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (holding that the sodomy laws of twenty-five states will not be
invalidated based on respondents' claim that "majority sentiments about the morality of homo-
sexuality should be declared inadequate"). In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia noted, "[i]fit is
constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is consti-
tutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexuals." Ramer,
517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
&4 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67 (invalidating Bowers and rejecting its flawed reasoning).
65 See id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a
legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause... ").
6 Id. at 570-73.
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omy laws, combined with more recent reevaluations of that law by
state and foreign jurisdictions, led the Court in Lawrence to conclude
that the liberty interest claimed by the petitioners was protected by
67the Due Process Clause. Justice Kennedy maintained that "our laws
and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.
These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.,,68
Several commentators have suggested that by 2003 the marginali-
zation of gays and lesbians by the sodomy laws was politically unac-
ceptable.0 Because gays and lesbians had become a recognized social
group and because there was no longer a consensus belief that the
group was dangerous or harmful, the Court in Lawrence, responding
to these conditions, limited the government's ability to harm gays and
lesbians.70 Others have suggested that in striking down the sodomy
laws in Texas, the Court was acting to lower the acrimony created by
the Bowers decision, and thus diffusing a source of tension in the on-
going culture wars.7' Because of the development of the lesbian and
gay civil rights movement, gays would no longer accept the discrimi-
nation embodied in the sodomy laws. Given this political reality, the
Court acted to set a new requirement of neutrality toward gays.72
Both state law and political attitudes meant that the kind of dismissive
treatment of the rights of gays reflected in Bowers was no longer an
approach the majority of the Court could take.
While in some ways Lawrence may be a reflection of the shift in
gays' and lesbians' social acceptance, fear of the possible effect of the
decision on issues such as gay marriage resulted in a cultural fire-
storm.75 In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts held that the state's ban on same-sex mar-
67 Id. at 577-78.
Id. at 571-72.
See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 17.
70 See id. at 1314 ("Once the Court has recognized a group, it requires the government to
articulate reasons beyond moral distaste for regulating that group.").
71 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004) (asserting that the Court force-
fully struck down the Bowers decision for demonstrative purposes).
2 See id. at 1040 ("Read together, Romer and Lawrence represent a regime shift for gay people
analogous to the regime shift that Brown and Loving represented for people of color and that
Roe and Craig represented for women. In all three sets of cases, the Court announced a new
constitutional baseline that was substantially closer to the norms espoused by an identity-based
social movement .. "). But see Note, Unfixing Lawrence, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2858 (2005) (em-
phasizing the limits of Lawrence in establishing freedom for sexual minorities).
SeeJeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2003, at 49 (ar-
guing that, as with the abortion issue in Roe, the Court's entry into the culture wars actually cre-
ated resistance to the rights the Court was attempting to protect).
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riage violated the state constitution.4 In reaching its conclusion that
discrimination against gays and lesbians was inconsistent with the
Massachusetts Constitution, the Supreme Judicial Court relied to
some extent upon Lawrence.75 The Goodridge decision met with fierce
resistance in Massachusetts, and around the country many states have
recently enacted anti-gay marriage laws.16  A constitutional amend-
ment banning same-sex marriage has also been introduced in the
U.S. Congress." Some commentators have suggested that disapproval
of same-sex marriage mobilized many voters and led to Republican
victories in the 2004 elections. 7
74 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
75 Id. at 958-59. Laurence Tribe argues that the recognition of same-sex marriage rights is
an inevitable consequence of the Lawrence decision. He notes, however, in the context of the
Court's decision in Loving, that "there is only so far an institution famously lacking both the
sword and the purse can push without incurring either lawful defiance in the form of a cam-
paign to amend the Constitution or unlawful defiance in the form of violent resistance." Tribe,
supra note 3, at 1947. Similarly, Katherine Franke argues that Lawrence's emphasis on protec-
tion of the intimate domestic sphere has led inevitably to political pressure to validate same-sex
marriages. However, she notes that state control and licensing of gay and lesbian sex comes
with the cost of marginalizing those who do not conform to the heterosexually-based model of
marriage. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 1399 (2004). In Newjersey, the supreme court recently held that the NewJersey Constitu-
tion's guarantee of equal protection required that the benefits of marriage enjoyed by hetero-
sexual couples be available to same-sex couples. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (NJ.
2006). It determined, however, that Lawrence did not establish a fundamental due process right
to marriage. Id. at 210 ("The Lawrence Court, however, pointedly noted that the case did 'not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homo-
sexual persons seek to enter.'" (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003))).
76 Judicial application of Lawrence to same-sex marriage has not always resulted in an exten-
sion of the right to marriage. In Wilson v. Ake, the court rejected the argument that Lawrence
created a right to same-sex marriage. 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2005). A similar
conclusion was reached by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d
451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), which explained that "because other language in Lawrence indi-
cates that the Court did not consider sexual conduct between same-sex partners a fundamental
right, it would be illogical to interpret the quoted language as recognizing a fundamental right
to enter a same-sex marriage." See also Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 16-17, 32 (N.Y.
2006) (holding that New York's Domestic Relations Law prohibiting same-sex marriage does
not violate either the due process or equal protection clause of the New York Constitution be-
cause recognition of same-sex marriage would promote neither the State's interest in marital
procreation nor its interest in dual-gender parenting).77
Efforts to pass a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage have thus far been
unsuccessful. In June 2006, the Senate defeated a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex
marriage. Shailagh Murray, Gay Marriage Amendment Fails in Senate, WASH. POST,June 8, 2006, at
Al1.78 See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Bans Fuel Conservative Agenda, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2004, at A39, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23672-2004Nov3.
html ("[Slome social conservatives contended that a desire to defend the traditional definition
of marriage drew millions of evangelical Christians to the polls and provided President Bush's
margin of victory."). In 2006, referenda banning same-sex marriage passed in Colorado, Idaho,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Only Arizona rejected a
ban on same-sex marriage. America Votes 2006, CNN.coM, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2006/pages/results/ballot.measures/.
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The fear that a wide range of state laws related to morality, in ar-
eas other than sodomy, would be altered by the Lawrence decision has
largely been unrealized. In his dissent, Justice Scalia included state
laws prohibiting "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitu-
tion, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality and obscenity" as
those likely to be found invalid.79 In decisions since Lawrence, how-
ever, state laws against adult incest, adult sexual activity with mi-81 • - 2 3 84"
nors, prostitution, sale of sex aids, child pornography, and adop-
tion by lesbians and gays, 5 have all been upheld. Lawrence has had
some effect, however, on the disparate treatment of same-sex and dif-
86ferent-sex underage sexual activities. In State v. Limon, the Supreme
Court of Kansas found the criminal sanctions against a male minor
who had sex with a younger male minor violated the Equal Protection
Clause because much more lenient treatment would have been given
to the same conduct if the participants were of different sexes.87 Rely-
ing on Lawrence, the court concluded that treating same-sex and dif-
ferent-sex offenders differently "bears no rational relationship to le-
gitimate State interests."8  Because "the promotion of majoritarian
sexual morality" is not a legitimate state interest, the Kansas law can-
not survive a rational basis review. 9
79 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 578, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
so See State v. Freeman, 801 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the right to
privacy does not extend to incest).
See State v. Oakley, 605 S.E.2d 215, 218 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("Lawrence's recognition of
autonomy and personal choice within consensual adult relationships does not offer constitu-
tional protection to evidence presented in a charge of criminally prohibited activity with mi-
nors .... ").
82 See People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that commer-
cial sex is not included within the scope of Lawrence); State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1236
(La. 2005) (holding that state laws concerning public sexual conduct and prostitution are un-
disturbed by Lawrence).
s3 See Williams v. Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (l1th Cir. 2004) (holding that Lawrence does
not establish a fundamental right to sexual intimacy; consequently a state law banning the sale
of "sex toys" does not impermissibly burden such a right).
84 See United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that taking sexually
explicit photos of children is not protected activity under Lawrence).
SeeLofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that Lawrence does not create a right for homosexual persons to adopt).
86 See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 28-29 (Kan. 2005) (explaining that Lawrence's commen-
tary on the stigma created by the criminalization of homosexual conduct has informed factually
distinct cases).
87 See id. at 24. The Kansas "Romeo and Juliet" law provides for a certain level of punish-
ment when there is voluntary sexual conduct between members of the opposite sex and when
the offender is less than nineteen years old and the victim is less than four years younger. Id.
The statute does not apply to sexual conduct between two minors of the same sex. In that case,
the offender can be punished much more severely, under the general rape, sodomy, and lewd
touching statutes. Id.
88 Id. at 38.
89 Id.
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The central holding of Lawrence, that homosexual sex cannot be
criminalized, has not been met with significant opposition. The con-
troversy over Lawrence is whether its reasoning will apply to other ar-
eas of gay rights, such as same-sex marriage and adoption, or to other
areas of sexual morality, such as incest and prostitution.
B. The Road Away from Glucksberg
1. Reaction to Glucksberg
Following the Court's decisions in Glucksberg and the related Vacco,
commentators expressed disappointment that the Court had not
done more to establish a clear standard with respect to assisted sui-
cide. 90 While declining to find a constitutional right to assisted sui-
cide, some of the Justices in Glucksberg left open the possibility that
under some narrow circumstances, such a right might exist.9' Noting
that the question of whether physician-assisted suicide should be al-
lowed was a topic of debate in state governments, the Court seemed
to encourage democratic resolution of the proper limitations on as-
sisted suicide, but perhaps anticipated the return of the issue to the
Court.92 Commentators suggested that the Court had ducked impor-
tant questions by refusing to focus narrowly on the specific right as-
90 See Donald H.J. Hermann, The Question Remains: Are There Terminally Ill Patients Who Have a
Constitutional Right to Physician Assistance in Hastening the Dying Process, 1 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE
L. 445, 445-46 (1997) (commenting broadly on the Supreme Court's avoidance of constitu-
tional pronouncements, using physician-assisted suicide as a clear example); Martha Minow,
Which Question, Which Lie?, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 2 (1997) (identifying confusing and divergent
Supreme Court opinions that fail to present a coherent standard).
91 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 789 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) ("While I
do not decide for all time that respondents' claim [of a right to assisted suicide] should not be
recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal
with that claim at this time."); id. at 741-42 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]here are situations in
which an interest in hastening death is legitimate. Indeed, not only is that interest sometimes
legitimate, I am also convinced that there are times when it is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion."); id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he state laws before us [prohibiting assisted sui-
cide] do not infringe directly upon the (assumed) central interest (what I have called the core
of the interest in dying with dignity) .... Were the legal circumstances different-for example,
were state law to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs
as needed to avoid the pain at the end of life-then the law's impact upon serious and other-
wise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more directly at issue.").
92 See Hermann, supra note 90, at 488-89 (noting Justices Souter and O'Connor's preference
that legislatures develop schemes to accommodate the interests of dying patients, but recogniz-
ing that the Court may again be faced with the issue).
Since Glucksberg, a few state courts have grappled with the constitutional issues related to
physician-assisted suicide. E.g., Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 95 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing no
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill competent patients); Sanderson
v. People, 12 P.3d 851, 854 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing no First Amendment free exer-
cise defense to physician-assisted suicide); People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2001) (recognizing no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia).
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serted: physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill competent per-93
son. Instead, the Court avoided the difficult issue by answering a
broader and easier question of whether there is a generalized right to
assistance in suicide.
Martha Minow suggests that the Court failed to confront the twin
difficulties inherent in the issue of physician-assisted suicide: that
such assisted suicides currently take place and that the public, but
unenforced, prohibition of assisted suicide prevents abuse. 5 By refus-
ing to address the reality that physician-assisted suicide currently ex-
ists, Minow argues that the Court simplifies the conflict inherent in
the issue. 96 If the current practice of physician-assisted suicide were
acknowledged, questions such as inequality of access, abuse of the
disabled, and appropriate regulation would have to be confronted."7
While the Court did articulate some of the threats to vulnerable peo-
ple that would accompany the legalization of assisted suicide, as Mi-
now explains, "the problem is not merely risks of abuse; the problem
arises from the inauguration of a regime in which people would have
tojustify continuing to live."99 The Court's lack of candor in address-
ing both the risks of legalization and the reality of current practice
led to discordance between the "law" and realiv and thus failed to
grapple with the difficulties inherent in the issue.
The current widespread ban on assisted suicide, affirmed by
Glucksberg, retains a symbolic, but perhaps not practical importance.
At least one commentator has estimated that between three and five
percent of American physicians have assisted suicide and asserted
that an active "euthanasia underground" is currently part of the
medical profession. 0 This unregulated and secret practice of assist-
ing suicide may well result in abuse, mistake, and a general lack of
93 See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Constitution,
82 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1998). Comparing the Glucksberg decision to death penalty doctrine, Burt
suggested that part of the Court's failure to develop a coherent approach to the issues pre-
sented in Glucksberg can be seen as "a response to the emotional impact of the subject-matter, to
the disturbing quality of the confrontation with death." Id. at 976.
94 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
95 See Minow, supra note 90, at 20-22. (discussing these two "lies" that are presented in the
physician-assisted suicide debate).
96 See id. at 20 (noting that, to Minow's knowledge, physicians have assisted and continue to
assist in suicide).
97 Id. at 27.
98 Id. at 21.
99 See id. at 26 (describing the Court's approach as "incomplete" in light of the complex is-
sues presented).
100 Roger S. Magnusson, "Underground Euthanasia" and the Harm Minimization Debate, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 486, 486 (2004) ("A national survey of 1,902 American physicians found that 3.3
percent had written at least one 'lethal prescription,' while 4.7 percent had provided at least
one lethal injection. A survey of American oncologists found that 3.7 percent had performed
euthanasia, while 10.8 percent had assisted suicide.").
Apr. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
quality assurance.'O The practice of physician-assisted suicide also
seems to be largely approved by the American public. According to
public polls, as early as 1996, there was "increasingly widespread sup-
port for allowing the terminal ill to hasten their deaths and avoid
painful, undignified, and inhumane endings to their lives.,
102
The prohibition of assisted suicide is particularly disingenuous
given that the same result, hastening death during a terminal illness,
can be accomplished by legal means. 10 3  Under current legal stan-
dards, a terminal patient may refuse life sustaining medical treat-
ment, may voluntarily stop eating and drinking, or may be deeply se-
dated, thus hastening death, to alleviate suffering. 10 4  Of course a
dying person's access to any of these approaches will depend on the
willingness and knowledge of the treating physician. As Ronald
Dworkin has noted, "[t]he current two-tier system-a chosen death
and an end of pain outside the law for those with connections and
stony refusals for most other people-is one of the greatest scandals
of contemporary medical practice."'0" Legally sanctioned physician-
assisted suicide might well make assistance in hastening death more
consistently available as well as make the process more transparent
and less subject to abuse.
10 6
101 Id. at 487-88 (enumerating the dangers inherent in unregulated physician-assisted sui-
cide).
102 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom, Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In 2006, Gallup's Annual Survey found that "the vast
majority of Americans continue to support 'right-to-die' laws for terminally ill patients, whether
that involves a doctor ending a patient's life by some painless means, or a doctor assisting a
terminally ill patient to commit suicide." Joseph Carroll, Public Continues to Support Right-to-Die
for Terminally Ill Patients, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE,June 19, 2006, at 62.
i03 See Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing, and the Future of Physician-Assisted Death, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2004) (noting that a patient can legally refuse treatment but cannot
legally request means to hasten death).
04 See id. at 1834-37; see also Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening Death Without Violating Legal or
Moral Prohibitions, 37 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 407 (2006) [hereinafter Cantor, Hastening Death] (discuss-
ing legal means of hastening death). Lawful forms of hastening death include: a physician
who, at a competent patient's behest, pulls the plug on a life-sustaining medical invention while
sharing the patient's wish to end a torturous dying process; a physician who cooperates with a
gravely afflicted person's fatal decision to voluntarily stop eating and drinking; a physician who
administers deep sedation to a preservable but suffering patient, knowing that the patient has
already declined artificial nutrition and hydration and, hence, will soon die; and a physician
who administers pain relief in a known lethal dosage (even with the primary intention to relieve
intractable suffering). Id.
105 Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosopher's Brief N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 27,
1997, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1237.
106 See Cantor, Hastening Death, supra note 104, at 430-31 (noting that current legal means of
hastening death are not widely available and finding a physician to participate in such practices
is purely fortuitous and capricious). The ability to access legal physician-assisted suicide might
well result in fewer assisted suicides. Knowing that the option for physician-assisted suicide ex-
ists may relieve anxiety and result in a decision not to hasten death. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
AGING AND OLD AGE 239-40 (1995) ("A right to seek assistance in committing suicide has value
1020 [Vol. 9:4
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2. Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Oregon, unique among the states, chose to permit and regulate
the practice of assisted suicide.10 7 In 1994, Oregon enacted the Death
With Dignity Act, which authorizes a physician to prescribe a lethal
dose of medication to a terminally ill patient.1' After originally ap-
proving the Act in 1994, Oregon reaffirmed its commitment to the
Death With Dignity Act in 1997 when it defeated a ballot measure
seeking to repeal the Act.' The Death With Dignity Act permits a
terminally ill adult to obtain a prescription from his or her physician
"for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified
manner. ' '  The Death With Dignity Act does not authorize euthana-
to the holder even if he never exercises it.... Knowing that if life becomes unbearable one can
end it creates peace of mind and so makes life more bearable.").
107 In Hawaii, a physician-assisted suicide bill was first introduced in 1999. Since then it has
repeatedly been introduced but has failed to pass. In 2002, a physician-assisted suicide bill in-
troduced in the Hawaiian legislature did pass the House but was narrowly defeated in the Sen-
ate. Mary Vorsino, Doctor-Assisted Suicide Bill Fades at Legislature, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN
NEWS, Feb. 6, 2005, available at http://starbulletin.com/2005/02/06/news/story2.html.
In Rhode Island, a bill patterned after the Oregon Death With Dignity Act was introduced in
2006. Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (July 2006),
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pas/2006_reports/72006.pdf.
In Vermont, a Death With Dignity Act was introduced in 2005 but failed to pass. KATHI
HAMLON, INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE, EUTHANASIA AND
ASSISTED-SUICIDE MEASURES IN THE UNITED STATES (1988-2005) (2005), available at
http://internationaltaskforce.org/usa.htm.
In Arizona, a Death With Dignity Act was introduced in 2005, but failed to pass. Id.
In Wisconsin, a Death With Dignity Act has been repeatedly introduced, most recently in
2005. Id.
In California, an assisted suicide bill passed two Assembly committees in 2005 but was not
scheduled for a full vote. A hearing on assisted suicide was scheduled for March 2006 before
the Senate's Judiciary Committee. Jim Puzzanghera, State Suicide Bill Back in Play: Assisted Death
May Get California's OK After Oregon Law Upheld, MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2006, at IA.
In Maine, several assisted suicide bills have been considered, beginning in 1991. A public
referendum for a Death With Dignity Act was narrowly defeated in 2000. HAMLON, supra.
In Michigan a voter petition for assisted suicide was rejected in 1998. Id.
In Washington, an initiative that would have allowed physician-assisted suicide and euthana-
sia was defeated in 1991. Id.
108 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-897 (2005); see also DANIEL HILLYARD &JOHN DOMBRINK, DYING
RIGHT: THE DEATH WITH DIGNITY MOVEMENT 69-98 (2001) (discussing passage of the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act).
109 In 1994 Oregon voters approved Measure 16, the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, by fifty-
one percent to forty-nine percent. In 1997, Oregon legislators voted to return the Act to the
voters for repeal. The attempted repeal, Measure 51, was rejected by sixty percent to forty per-
cent. See DEATH WITH DIGNITY NAT'L CTR., LEGAL AND POLITICAL TIMELINE IN OREGON, available
at http://www.deathwithdignity.org/historyfacts/oregontimeline.asp (last visitedJan. 28, 2007).
I0 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805. A written request must be signed and dated by the patient and
witnessed by two others who, in the presence of the patient, attest that the patient is "capable,
acting voluntarily, and is not being coerced to sign the request." OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810.
Upon receiving the request, a physician must determine that the patient is terminally ill, is ca-
pable of, and has made the request voluntarily. The physician must also inform the patient of
her diagnosis, her prognosis, the risks of the requested medication and the alternatives to as-
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sia, and assisted suicide is only available to adult residents of Ore-
gon."' While the number of deaths as a result of assisted suicide in
Oregon are few, the number of people requesting and using assisted
suicide has steadily increased in the years since legalization. In 1998,
twenty-four prescriptions for lethal doses of medication were written
and sixteen were used; in 1999, thirty-three prescriptions were written
and twenty-seven were used; in 2000, thirty-nine prescriptions were
written and twenty-seven were used; in 2001, forty-four prescriptions
were written and twenty-one were used; in 2002, fifty-eight prescrip-
tions were written and thirty-eight were used; in 2003, sixty-eight pre-
scriptions were written and forty-two were used; in 2004, sixty pre-
scriptions were written and thirty-seven were used; and in 2005, sixty-
four prescriptions were written and thirty-two were used."
2
As a backlash against the Oregon statute, Attorney General John
Ashcroft issued a directive in 2001 proclaiming that the use of con-
trolled substances for assisted suicide violated the Controlled Sub-
stances Act ("CSA") and instructed the DEA to enforce the CSA
against physicians in Oregon."3 The CSA allows the Attorney General
to revoke a physician's ability to prescribe controlled substances if the
physician's conduct in prescribing medication is inconsistent with the
public interest."4 Attorney General Ashcroft exercised this authority
by determining that physician-assisted suicide served no legitimate
medical purpose and was inconsistent with the public interest. 5
However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that
Attorney General Ashcroft's directive concerning assisted suicide ex-
ceeded the authority granted to him by the CSA. 16 Congress's intent
sisted suicide. The physician must refer the patient for counseling if she may be suffering from
a psychiatric disorder. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.815-127.825.
1 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.860; § 127.995.
12 DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., OFF. OF DISEASE & EPIDEMIOLOGY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON
OREGON'S DEATH 'WITH DIGNITY ACT 11 (2006). Some demographic patterns have emerged
over the last several years. Terminally ill young people were significantly more likely to use as-
sisted suicide. Divorced and never-married people are also more likely to use assisted suicide,
and those with a college degree or higher education were much more likely to use assisted sui-
cide than those without a high school diploma. Id. at 12.
"3 Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306).
114 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2004), affd, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126
S. Ct. 904 (2006).
15 Id. at 1123. Notably, Attorney General Janet Reno had earlier declined to issue a directive
concerning the use of controlled substances in physician-assisted suicide. She determined that
"the CSA does not authorize [the DEA] to prosecute, or to revoke DEA registration of, a physi-
cian who has assisted in a suicide in compliance with Oregon law." Id.
16 Id. at 1125. The Court of Appeals held that Attorney General Ashcroft's directive was con-
tradicted by the plain language of the Controlled Substances Act and contravened the intent of
Congress. Because the directive interferes with Oregon's ability to regulate medical care, Con-
gress would have had to give clear authorization to allow it. The court determined that Con-
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was to limit the scope of the CSA to drug abuse, not to interfere with
state regulation of the medical profession. 117 The Supreme Court re-
cently affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals." In an opin-
ion by Justice Kennedy, the Court noted that "Americans are engaged
in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide." 9 The Court further con-
cluded that the CSA was meant by Congress to combat drug abuse
and did not authorize the Attorney General to "effect a radical shift
of authority from the States to the Federal Government to define
general standards for medical practice in every locality.' 2°
Perhaps the most studied regulation of assisted suicide has oc-
curred in the Netherlands. 2' Assisted suicide and euthanasia became
legal in the Netherlands in 1994 when the Dutch Supreme Court
recognized that the necessity defense to criminal prosecution for a
killing could be asserted by a physician who had assisted suicide. 22 In
2002, the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act
(Act) went into effect.2 2  This Act exempts a physician from criminal
gress gave no such authorization and that the Attorney General's authority under the CSA is
limited to the field of drug abuse. Id. at 1125-29.
117 Id. at 1125.
[is Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). Argument was held in the case on October 5,
2005. At the argument, Justice Ginsburg noted the inconsistency of the government's position
with the assumption of the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg that policy concerning assisted sui-
cide was left for the states to decide. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-20, Gonzales v. Ore-
gon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), 2005 WL 2659027.
11 Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)).
120 Id. at 925. Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Thomas dissented, arguing that the Attorney Gen-
eral could properly limit the used of controlled substances for assisted suicide because such use
did not constitute a legitimate medical purpose as required by the CSA:
Virtually every relevant source of authoritative meaning confirms that the phrase "legiti-
mate medical purpose" does not include intentionally assisting suicide. "Medicine" re-
fers to "the science and art dealing with the prevention, cure, or alleviation of dis-
ease."... [V]irtually every medical authority from Hippocrates to the current American
Medical Association (AMA) confirms that assisting suicide has seldom or never been
viewed as a form of "prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease," and (even more so) that
assisting suicide is not a "legitimate" branch of that "science and art." ... Indeed, the
AMA has determined that "physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with
the physician's role as healer."
Id. at 11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1 See generally JOHN GRIFFITHS ET AL., EUTHANASIA AND THE LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS (Am-
sterdam Univ. Press 1998); Margaret Pabst Battin, Should We Copy the Dutch? The Netherlands'
Practice of Voluntary Euthanasia as a Model for the United States, in EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD
PATIENT, THE GOOD SOCIETY (Univ. Publ'g Group 1992);Jocelyn Downie, The Contested Lessons of
Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 8 HEALTH LJ. 119 (2000); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Legalization of As-
sisted Suicide and the Law of Unintended Consequences: A Review of the Dutch and Oregon Experiments
and Leading Utilitarian Arguments for Legal Change, 2004 WiS. L. REV 1347 (2004).
122 GRIFFITHSETAL., supra note 121, at 229-38.
123 The Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and the Ministry ofJustice, Termination
of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, Stb. 2001, nr. 137, ch. 2, art.
2, § 1 (Neth.).
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prosecution if she terminates a life at the person's request and, if 1)
the request is voluntary and well considered; 2) the patient's suffer-
ing is lasting and unbearable; 3) the patient has been informed of
her diagnosis and prognosis and the patient holds the conviction that
there is no other reasonable solution; and 4) an independent physi-
cian has been consulted who has seen the patient and who gives a
written opinion that the requirements of the Act have been fol-
lowed. 124 Approximately five percent of the deaths in any given year
in the Netherlands are the result of euthanasia or physician-assisted
suicide.125
While the practice seems to be widely accepted in the Nether-
lands, some controversies have arisen concerning the assisted suicide
and euthanasia regime. There is evidence that some physicians are
administering euthanasia without an explicit request from the pa-
tient.12 6 There has also been debate in the Netherlands about eutha-
nasia performed on children. The current law allows euthanasia on
children ages twelve to sixteen with the parents' consent; however,
new guidelines will allow euthanasia on terminally ill newborns with
the parents' consent.12 7
In Belgium, euthanasia was legalized in 2002.2 Similar to the
Dutch law, the Belgian regulation allows "termination of life by re-
quest" for a competent adult who makes a voluntary, considered and
repeated request and who is in a "medically hopeless situation char-
acterised by persistent and unbearable physical or mental suffer-
,,129 oing .... As of 2004, 259 terminally ill patients in Belgium hadelected termination of life.' 30 Assisted suicide has also long been le-
124 Id.
125 See Richard Renigsen, Dutch Euthanasia: The New Government Ordered Study, 20 ISSUES L. &
MED. 73, 74 (2004) (giving figures for "active" euthanasias, physician-assisted suicides, and total
deaths in the Netherlands in 2001).
126 See Susan M. Wolf, Assessing Physician Compliance With the Rules for Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide, 165 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1677 (2005) ("Data gathered from the first major em-
pirical research documented a substantial incidence of what the researchers called "LAWER,"
life-terminating acts without explicit request, a clear violation of the Dutch rules."); see also
Renigsen, supra note 125, at 75 (noting that the number of cases of involuntary active euthana-
sia remains high).
127 See Gregory Crouch, A Crusade Born of a Suffering Infant's Cry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at
A4 (reporting on a Dutch doctor proposing "a team of physicians, together with the baby's par-
ents, to decide openly in very rare, extraordinary cases whether or not to end a child's life.");
Jim Holt, Euthanasia for Babies?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 10, 2005, at sec. 6, col. 3 (remarking that
two Dutch physicians have published guidelines for infant euthanasia in the New England Journal
of Medicine).
128 Maurice Adams, Comparative Reflections on the Belgian Euthanasia Act of 2002, 11 MED. L.
REV. 353, 353 (2003). An English translation of the Belgian Act is available at
httg//www.kuleuven.ac.be/cbmer/viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=DOCS&ID=23.
Id. at 365-66.
i0 VALERIE J. VOLLMAR, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE (Oct. 2004),
http://www.willamette.edu/law/pas/2004_reports/02004.htnl.
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galized in Switzerland, which has become a destination for "death
tourism.
In 2005, a bill entitled Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill was in-
troduced in Parliament in the United Kingdom. 32 The bill would le-
galize physician-assisted suicide and, in appropriate cases, allow phy-
sicians to administer lethal drugs. 33 And in Canada, a "Right to Die
With Dignity" bill has been proposed which would amend the Crimi-
nal Code "to allow any person, under certain conditions, to aid a per-
son close to death or suffering from a debilitating illness to die with
dignity if the person has expressed the free and informed wish to
die." 3  Recently in Italy, a controversy erupted when Piergiorgio
Welby, a poet, publicly lobbied the government for legal permission
to have a physician sedate him and remove his respirator. Mr. Welby
had been suffering for many years with muscular dystrophy. His ap-
peal received widespread coverage and created political controversy.
Even though he was denied the legal authority he sought, Mr. Welby
ended his life after a doctor sedated him and removed his respira-
tor. 135
While certainly authorized in only a minority of jurisdictions, a
growing acceptance of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide is
evident. As Richard Posner suggested twenty years ago:
In cases of terminally ill, pain-wracked, or severely impaired people who
are or anticipate shortly becoming physically incapable of committing
suicide, Mill's theory of the proper limits of government suggest, al-
though does not prove, that a right of physician-assisted suicide should
be recognized (subject to appropriate safeguards...) and that therefore
the law forbidding the practice should be repealed. The fear that under
such a regime physicians will hustle their patients to a premature and
undesired death seems greatly exaggerated; indeed, the suicide rate
136might actually fall if physician-assisted suicide were permitted.
This understanding of the limited role of government in controlling
end of life decisions has led some legislatures to focus on the proper
limitations and conditions of physician-assisted suicide, rather than
maintaining possibly futile, criminal prohibitions.
131 Hilary White, Switzerland Refuses to Alter Assisted Suicide Law to Nix Death Tourism, LIFE-
SITENEWS.COM,June 2, 2006, available at http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2006/jun/06060210.html.
132 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, 2004, H.L. Bill [17] (Gr. Brit.).
13 Id. In May 2006, the House of Lords effectively killed the bill by voting, 148 to 140, to de-
lay consideration of the bill. Philippe Naughton, Lords Block Mercy Killings Bill, TIMES ONLINE,
May 12, 2006, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/
article716892.ece.
I'. Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Right to Die with Dignity), 2005, H.C. Bill [C-407]
(Can.).
135 Ian Fisher, Italian Poet Dies With Help from a Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at A3.
136 POSNER, supra note 106, at 260.
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3. Culture Wars
While the acceptance of assisted suicide for the terminally ill has137
grown, that acceptance has in turn created a backlash against has-
tening of the dying process. 38 As part of advocating a "culture of
life," some have linked opposition to abortion, stem cell research,
and physician-assisted suicide as similar assaults on the value of life.
39
The two sides of this cultural debate were dramatically exposed by
the circumstances surrounding the death of Terri Schiavo. 4U The is-
sue was not direct physician-assisted suicide, but rather the legally
permissible withdrawal of life sustaining treatment. Nonetheless, this
controversy brought into sharp relief the cultural divide on issues
surrounding assisted suicide. Ms. Schiavo suffered cardiac arrest in
1990 and because of the resulting lack of oxygen to her brain, re-
mained, until her death in 2005, in a coma and then later a "persis-
tent vegetative state.' 14' Unable to eat or drink on her own, Ms.
Schiavo was fed and hydrated through a feeding tube.' 42 Controversy
surrounding her condition arose when her husband, Michael
137 See, e.g., Jerry Fensterman, I See Why Others Choose to Die, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2006, at
All (describing why the author supports assisted suicide); Sam Lister & David Charter, BMA
Drops Its Opposition to Doctor-Assisted Suicide, LONDON TIMES ONLINE, July 1, 2005, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article539179.ece (reporting that the British
Medical Association has dropped its opposition to physician-assisted suicide); Peter Singer, The
Sanctity of Life, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct., 2005, at 40 (stating that during the next thirty-five
years, the traditional view of the sanctity of life will collapse under pressure from scientific,
technological, and demographic developments); Peter Steinfels, Beliefs: In the Right-to-Die Debate,
the Public Reveals Strong Views, but Also the Ability to Make Distinctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at
A12 (noting that the public has the ability to make distinctions in the assisted suicide debate);
William Yardley, For Role in Suicide, a Friend to the End Is Now Facing Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005,
at Al ("It seems no one in [Corwall, Conn.] believes a crime was committed on the morning
last June when Huntington Williams cleaned a revolver and advised his old friend John T.
Welles where to aim. Mr. Welles, 66, was dying of cancer and, according to a police report,
wanted to make sure he killed himself with one clean shot."); The Art of Dying, ECONOMIST, Oct.
15-21, 2005, at 59 (reporting on three countries and one American State where euthanasia is
permitted).
18 E.g., Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1-2, Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-623) (noting the position of Not Dead Yet, a group
composed of several disability rights organizations, that physician-assisted suicide "encourages,
rather than discourages, certain people to die solely because of their disability.... Oregon's
assisted suicide law implicitly states that some people's lives are worth saving and others are
not").
139 The 2004 Republican Party Platform contained several paragraphs on the "culture of life"
and urged opposition to abortion, stem cell research and same-sex marriage. David D.
Kirkpatrick, Draft G.O.P. Platform Backs Bush on Security, Gay Marriage and Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug, 25, 2004, at A20.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Schiavo Case: The Legacy; A Collision of Disparate Forces May Be
Reshaping American Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A18 (stating that Schiavo's case "has be-
come a touchstone in American culture").
141 InreGuardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
142 Id.
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Schiavo, sought to have her feeding tube removed and thus allow her
to die. Ms. Schiavo's parents strongly objected to this decision and
sought to overrule Mr. Schiavo's request.'
4
Many disputes swirled around Ms. Schiavo's situation: whether
she was in a "persistent vegetative state" or in a higher functioning
"minimally conscious state 4 5 whether Ms. Schiavo had clearly made
known, when she was well, that she would not want to live in her
brain damaged condition;14 6 whether her husband, Mr. Schiavo, had a
financial conflict of interest that made him an inappropriate guard-
ian; 1 47 what standard of proof the Florida courts should apply when
attempting to determine Ms. Schiavo's wishes; 48 what the appropriate
143 SeeJoan Didion, The Case of Theresa Schiavo, N.Y. REV. OF BOoKs, June 9, 2005 (telling the
life story of Theresa Schiavo), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18050.
In 1998, eight years after Ms. Schiavo's cardiac arrest and resulting brain damage, Michael
Schiavo, her husband and guardian, petitioned the Florida courts to authorize termination of
life-sustaining treatment. Michael Schiavo presented evidence to the court to support his con-
tention that Terri Schiavo would have wished to have life-sustaining treatment terminated. Mr.
and Mrs. Schindler, Terri Schiavo's parents, opposed the petition. However, the court granted
the petition. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908, 2000 WL 34546715, at *1, *7 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 11, 2000), affd, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs.
Schindler made numerous attempts in the Florida courts to have the decision vacated. Follow-
ing the denial of the Schindlers' last appeal, Terri Schiavo's feeding tube was removed on Oc-
tober 15, 2003.
The Florida legislature then acted by granting Governor Jeb Bush authority to prevent the
withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if the patient had no living will, the pa-
tient was in a persistent vegetative state, nutrition and hydration had been withheld from the
patient, and a member of the patient's family challenged the withholding of nutrition and hy-
dration. H. 35-E, 2003 Leg., 418th Sess. (Fla. 2003). The Governor issued an order requiring
that Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube be reinserted. The validity of the Florida law was challenged in
Florida court and found to be an unconstitutional use of legislative power and a violation of Ms.
Schiavo's rights. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 337 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121
(2005). On March 18, 2005, Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube was again removed.
At this point, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation ordering the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida to conduct a de novo review of any claims of a violation of Ms.
Schiavo's constitutional rights. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (providing
relief for the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo). The district court denied any injunctive relief
because the necessary showing of constitutional or statutory violations was not made. Schiavo ex
rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1384-88 (M.D. Fla. 2005), affd, 404 F.3d 1270
(11th Cir. 2005).
Terri Schiavo died on March 31, 2005.
145 See Ronald Cranford, Facts, Lies, and Videotapes: The Permanent Vegetative State and the Sad
Case of Terri Schiavo, 33J.L. MED. & ETHICs 363, 366 (2005) (noting the importance of under-
standing and appreciating: "1) the current diagnosis.., and 2) the potential for neurological
recovery and potential response to treatment or rehabilitation").
146 Didion, supra note 143, at 62 (discussing whether there was any "directive" from Ms.
Schiavo to be followed).
147 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 178 (discussing the money Mr. Schiavo would
inherit upon the death of Ms. Schiavo).
148 Darren P. Mareiniss, A Comparison ofCruzan and Schiavo: The Burden of Proof Due Process,
and Autonomy in the Persistently Vegetative Patient, 26J. LEGAL MED. 233, 243 (2005) (explaining
that Mr. Schiavo had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. Schiavo
would want to end her life).
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roles of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches were in this
type of dispute;149 and whether the federal government should inter-
vene.1 50 At its most simple and compelling level, however, the conflict
was between "the right to die" and the interference with this right by
state and federal officials. Although a passionate minority regarded
the Florida courts' decisions allowing the removal of the feeding tube
as an affront to the sanctity of life,' most Americans seemed to view
the attempts by the Florida legislature, the governor, and the U.S.
Congress to interfere with the death of Ms. Schiavo as unwarranted
invasions of personal autonomy and privacy.
152
The vehemence of the public's rejection of the government's ef-
forts to interfere with the Florida courts' handling of Ms. Schiavo's
condition was surprising to many.153 The public largely rejected the
invocation of "the culture of life" and focused instead on the gov-
ernmental assault on the control over decisions concerning death.
The common belief seemed to be that decisions in this area should
be made by the individual and the family, not by state or federal offi-
cials. The strongly held views on both sides of this issue led to wide,
and perhaps unanticipated, polarization.15 4 What was exposed was a
debate about an individual's control of her death and a belief that
decisions in this context are not simple and not susceptible to broad
governmental proscriptions. What may have seemed self-evident to
the Supreme Court in 1997-that hastening death of the terminally
149 See, e.g., Terri D. Keville & Jon B. Eisenberg, Bush v. Schiavo and the Separation of Powers:
Why a State Legislature Cannot Empower a Governor to Order Medical Treatment When There Is a Final
Court Judgment that the Patient Would Not Want It, 7 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGEs 81, 97-103 (2005)
(examining the complex separation of power issues in the Schiavo case).
15o See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., Schiavo Law Prompts Constitutional Questions, 12 A.B.A. J. E-
REP. 1, 2 (Mar. 25, 2005) (summarizing concerns about federalism raised by the case).
1 In a few states, legislation has been enacted that limits the ability to withdraw food and
hydration or restricts whom may act as a guardian for an incapacitated person. See Stolberg,
supra note 140.
,5 See Didion, supra note 143, at 64 ("A majority of Americans... saw a gross example of leg-
islative opportunism, a clear demonstration of the power of the religious right to influence leg-
islation, a threat most specifically to pro-choice protections in the matter of abortion and more
generally to the privacy rights embodied in the Constitution itself.").
153 Sidney Blumenthal, The Year In Politics, SALON, Dec. 29, 2005, http://dir.salon.com/
story/news/feature/2005/12/29/yearinpolitics/index.html ("An ABC News poll found that
63 to 28 percent backed the removal of Schiavos [sic] feeding tube and 67 to 19 percent be-
lieved that politicians urging that she be kept alive were demagogic and unprincipled.").
154 See Didion, supra note 143, at 69 ("Old polarizations took over. Differences became in-
tolerances. Before the end of the first news cycle, those who believed the removal of the feed-
ing tube to be a morally correct decision were being referred to as 'murderers,' and those trou-
bled by the decision, even those of no perceptible religiosity, as 'fundamentalist freaks,'
,evangelical mullahs."').
[Vol. 9:4
SEX AND DEATH
ill was not consistent with our cultural tradition 55 -was no longer socertain.
IV. REEXAMINATION OF ASSISTED SUICIDE
If laws against physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill have
become, like sodomy laws before Lawrence, mostly of symbolic value,
will the Court find that the liberty interest in controlling one's death
overrides any state interest in making a generalized moral statement
about the value of life? If faced with a case in which palliative care
cannot relieve the suffering of a dying person or a situation where
physicians feel constrained from giving effective levels of pain relief
because of its possibly fatal effect, the concurring opinions in Glucks-
berg suggest that the issue should be reexamined. The Court could
turn to the liberty interest articulated in Lawrence that "presumes
autonomy of self"" and invalidate state laws criminalizing physician-
assisted suicide. The groundwork for such an outcome has been laid:
a doctrinal expansion of due process; increased state and foreign re-
vision of assisted suicide laws; popular rejection of government inter-
ference with end of life decisions; and a growing willingness to face
the reality of current end of life practices.
Lawrence marked a significant step away from the "stranglehold of
Glucksber' in its approach to due process. Rather than focusing on
whether an action is encompassed in a fundamental right, the Law-
rence Court balanced the importance of the action to individual
autonomy against the state's interests in prohibiting it. 5 In contrast
to searching through history to determine whether the specific right• ,,• • , •• • ,0159
asserted is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, the
Lawrence approach looks at both past history and emerging trends to
determine the content of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.' 6° Both of these aspects of the due process analysis set forth in
155 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) ("The history of the law's treat-
ment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of
nearly all efforts to permit it.").156 See id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (declining to address the narrower question of
whether a person who is suffering great pain has a constitutionally cognizable interest in con-
trolling the circumstances of his or her death); id. at 750-51 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
similar intent of doctors to ease a patient's suffering in cases where doctors provide pain-killing
medication that hastens death and those where the doctor complies with a patient's request for
lethal medication); id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (commenting that it would be a different
issue if the state prohibited palliative care or withheld pain medications).
157 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
158 Id. at 567 (noting that "absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law pro-
tects [,]" the State should not seek to control private sexual conduct).
159 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
160 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72. One commentator has suggested that condemnation of
same-sex sodomy does not have the same longstanding history as condemnation of assisted sui-
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Lawrence have significant implications for a reexamination of physi-
cian-assisted suicide.
In determining that a liberty interest exists in "controlling the
time and manner of one's death," Judge Reinhardt in Compassion in
Dying v. Washington emphasized the protection in the Due Process
Clause for the "right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life" as set
forth in Casey.161 Judge Reinhardt concluded that "[a] competent
terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure of his life, has
a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane
death ... .,,162 This analysis is echoed in the concurring opinions of
Justices Souter and O'Connor in Glucksberg and is similar to the ap-
proach taken in Lawrence when the Court determined that state pro-
hibition of homosexual sodomy was an affront to the dignity and
autonomy of those choosing to enter into intimate same-sex relation-
ships.
Just as the Lawrence decision was issued at a time when sodomy
laws had begun to be repealed or found unconstitutional under state
law, and when international norms rejected anti-sodomy laws, so does
the current political and cultural background reveal a time of transi-
tion with respect to restrictions on physician-assisted suicide. 163 At the
same time, there seems to be a growing conviction that individual
choices with respect to end of life decisions should be respected, and
hostility to government interference with those choices. This politi-
cal and cultural shift makes the recognition of a liberty interest by the
Court less surprising than it may have been in 1997 when Glucksberg
was decided. Just as Lawrence represented a "regime shift for gay
cide and thus Lawrence and Glucksberg can be reconciled. Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertar-
ian?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1140, 1163 (2004); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 341 (2004) (noting the Court's consideration in Lawrence of the
modem trend of decriminalizing homosexual sodomy rather than just considering historical
treatment of such acts as suggested in Glucksberg).
16, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub noma, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
162 Id. at 814; see also id. ("For [some] patients, wracked by pain and deprived of all pleasure,
a state-enforced prohibition on hastening their deaths condemns them to unrelieved misery or
torture.").
163 At the time Glucksberg was decided, even the law in Oregon was not yet in effect. Explain-
ing that decision, Robert Burt noted that "the Supreme Court had never in its history constitu-
tionally imposed a rule on all states where no state had ever implemented such a rule. When
the Court had overturned state abortion laws or death penalty laws... there were considerable
numbers of states that had already adopted these results. . . ." Burt, supra note 93, at 965-66.
Burt believes the Court's collective response in Glucksberg can be understood as a signal that the
issue "was not yet ripe for definitive resolution but must await future developments in state legis-
latures and in repeated, particularized litigation." Id. at 975.
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people" 6 4 that was in a sense mandated by the strength of the gay
rights movement, so too might the social support for autonomy in
end of life decisions mandate a change in the Court's approach to
physician-assisted suicide.
Of course a decision lessening a state's ability to criminalize physi-
cian-assisted suicide would likely create an outcry by those who pro-
mote a "culture of life." The outcry would primarily be concerned
with what might come next: involuntary euthanasia; adverse judg-
ments about the "quality of life" of the severely disabled; or coercion
of the vulnerable into assisted suicide. Much like Lawrence, the de-
bate would center not on the specific holding of the case but on the
possible outcome of subsequent cases. While few see the de-
criminalizing of homosexual sodomy as particularly significant, many
fear the further expansion of the rights of sexual minorities and the
relaxation of standards of sexual morality. Similarly, while many
might acknowledge the legitimacy of physician-assisted suicide for the
suffering terminally ill competent adult, the expansion of assisted sui-
cide to any other context will be greatly feared.
If the Court recognized a liberty interest that limited the state's
ability to interfere with end of life decisions, it would likely narrowly
define that interest to give the state broad discretion in fashioning
appropriate regulation. States would be free to develop appropriate
guidelines and protocols to ensure that only the terminally ill who
make a voluntary and well-informed decision may receive physician-
assisted suicide. The liberty interest articulated by the Court would
not interfere with states' abilities to regulate medical practice and es-
tablish guidelines and protocols but would prevent state usurpation
of individual decision making concerning the timing and manner of
death. Because of the significant interests the state has in protecting
the vulnerable from a hastened death, the scope of a liberty interest
in controlling one's death could not be as expansive as one's interest
in autonomy concerning intimate sexual behavior. The difficulty in
delineating the liberty interest while still allowing the state to advance
significant interests might well be an additional reason the Court
would hesitate to reopen the question, hoping instead, that the issue
is resolved by state legislatures.
14 Eskridge, supra note 71, at 1040. The same dynamics that expand rights based on an iden-
tity-based social movement may result in the expansion of rights to those seeking to control end
of life decisions. See McGowan, supra note 17, at 1333 (discussing identity-based social move-
ments).
165 State restrictions on physician-assisted suicide could be viewed analogously to restrictions
in the abortion context. States can fashion limitations and conditions on abortion so long as
they do not place an "undue burden" on a woman's decision, prior to the viability of the fetus,
to terminate her pregnancy. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
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V. CONCLUSION
The liberty interest espoused in Lawrence encourages, if not de-
mands, a new look at government restraints on the "autonomy of
self." How far it lifts those restraints has been left undefined. But
because the Due Process Clause methodology in Glucksberg and Bowers
has been discredited, there is ample room to contemplate an itera-
tion of the liberty interest that includes the right to hasten one's own
death. Still, the Lawrence Court's approach to due process-its bal-
ancing of personal autonomy and state interests-begs the question
of whether it would continue that approach or retreat to a less expan-
sive standard in ruling on the constitutionality of that right.
What appears clear enough is that physician-assisted suicide for
the terminally ill competent adult bears many of the same claims for
recognition as those asserted in Lawrence for adult sexual relations.
Both claims go to the core of individual identity, both have historical
roots and growing social acceptance, and in both cases state prohibi-
tions may be more symbolic of moral disapproval than any real at-
tempt to regulate the prohibited behavior. Of course, there are also
significant differences. The potential for abuse in assisted suicide
may be greater than the Court would sanction. But the logic of the
newly established due process doctrine, and burgeoning tolerance of
the practice, point toward expansion of liberty in its favor.
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